DETERMINATION OF THE MARKET SURVEILLANCE AND COMPLIANCE PANEL
MSCP/2026/D4

Market Surveillance and Compliance Panel
Professor Walter Woon, Chairman
Professor Euston Quah
Mr. Philip Chua
Mr. Yeo Yek Seng

Date of Determination
12 August 2026

Party
Taser Power Pte. Ltd.

Subject
Failure to comply with gate closure rules on 12 April 2026

FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES

1. On 13 May 2026, Taser Power Pte. Ltd. (“Taser Power”) submitted its self-report regarding the offer variations after gate closure for TSRBLK1 for periods 37 and 38 on 12 April 2026.

2. TSRBLK1 was on planned outage from 9 April 2026 to 12 April 2026. It synchronised back to the grid at 17:02 hrs (P35) on 12 April 2026 and was expected to ramp up to its scheduled load by the end of period 35. However, upon synchronisation, TSRBLK1 did not respond to the load control commands by the duty Shift Charge Engineer to increase the unit loading.

3. Given the instability to safely increase load and the absence of identifiable alarms, Taser Power made the decision to shut down the unit safely and facilitate further investigation. Offer variations after gate closure were accordingly submitted for periods 37 and 38.

4. Post-shutdown investigations found that this condition arose from a software issue involving an erroneous configuration setting in TSRBLK1’s unit controller. Instead of enabling automatic switching to “load control mode” following synchronisation, the unit controller configuration setting had changed such that the configuration was to maintain its “speed control mode”. This incorrect change to the unit controller’s mode setting was traced to an offline software transfer of the gas turbine programme from the application server to the function module carried out on 10 April 2026 to fix an unrelated server fault.

5. Following identification of the issue, the setting was corrected to ensure proper automatic transition from “speed control mode” to “load control mode” upon synchronisation. Taser Power also updated its existing checklist to include an additional verification of the unit controller configuration settings for start-ups, and configured a new reminder message on its Overview Operating Monitor page to prompt operators to verify this control mode configuration during each start-up.

6. The offer variations after gate closure for periods 37 and 38 were due to an oversight and do not fall under any of the exemptions in section 10.4.1.1 of Chapter 6 of the Singapore Electricity Market Rules ("Market Rules").

7. On 3 July 2026, the MSCP wrote to inform Taser Power that it considered Taser Power to be *prima facie* in breach of section 10.4.1 of Chapter 6 of the Market Rules for TSRBLK1 for periods 37 and 38 on 12 April 2026.

8. On 16 July 2026, Taser Power submitted its written representations to the MSCP, including a summary of the incident, remedial actions it had taken, and mitigating factors for the MSCP's consideration.

9. As part of its mitigating factors, Taser Power reiterated that the configuration change in TSRBLK1's unit controller was neither intended as part of the software transfer on 10 April 2026, nor identified by its original equipment manufacturer ("OEM"). The said software transfer was carried out on the advice of the unit's OEM whom Taser Power had consulted with and relied on. The OEM did not once advise Taser Power that the software transfer could affect the automatic transition from "speed control mode" to "load control mode" upon synchronisation. The issue which subsequently arose during start-up was therefore something that Taser Power could not reasonably have anticipated.

10. Taser Power did not require a hearing.

APPLICABLE MARKET RULES

11. <u>Section 10.4.1 of Chapter 6 provides that</u>

10.4.1 Notwithstanding sections 5.1.5, 5.1.6 and 5.1.7, no *offer variation* or revised *standing offer* shall be submitted by or for a *market participant* within 65 minutes immediately prior to the *dispatch period* to which the *offer variation* or revised *standing offer* applies, except:

10.4.1.1 where it is intended:

a. for a *generation registered facility*, to reflect its expected ramp-up and ramp-down profiles during periods following *synchronisation* or preceding *desynchronisation*; or

b. for a *generation registered facility*, to reflect its revised capability for the three consecutive *dispatch periods* immediately following a *forced outage* or its failure to *synchronise*; or

c. for an *import registered facility*, to reflect its revised capacity for the three consecutive *dispatch periods* immediately following a *forced outage*, including (i) a *forced outage* of the *interties* connecting the *import registered facility* to the *transmission system*, (ii) a *forced outage* or failure to *synchronise* of any constituent *generating units* in the *interconnected system* that form part of the *import registered facility*, or (iii) a *transmission* constraint within the *interconnected system*; or

d. to contribute positively to the resolution of an *energy* surplus situation pertaining to which the *EMC* has issued an *advisory notice* under section 9.3.1, by allowing for decreased supply of *energy*; or

e. to contribute positively to the resolution of *energy*, *reserve* or *regulation* shortfall situations pertaining to which the *EMC* has issued *advisory notices* under section 9.3.1, by allowing for increased supply of *energy*, *reserve* or *regulation*; or

f. to contribute positively to the resolution of *energy*, *reserve* or *regulation* shortfall situations in that *dispatch period*, where:

   i. the shortfall situations were indicated in a system status *advisory notice* issued by the *EMC* in respect of a *high-risk operating state* or *emergency operating state* declared by the *PSO*; and

   ii. at the time of submission of such *offer variation* or revised *standing offer*, the *EMC* has not yet withdrawn, in respect of that *dispatch period*, such system status *advisory notice*,

   by allowing for increased supply of *energy*, *reserve* or *regulation*; and

g. for a *load registered facility*, to reflect its revised capability during a *forced outage* or following a decrease in *energy* withdrawal under sections 9.3.3 and/or 9.3.4 of Chapter 5; and

10.4.1.2 where the price so *offered*, other than for additional quantities of *energy*, *reserve* or *regulation*, is the same as that previously *offered* for that *dispatch period*.

ENFORCEMENT

12. Based on the facts above, the MSCP has determined that Taser Power breached section 10.4.1 of Chapter 6 of the Market Rules for the offer variations after gate closure for periods 37 and 38 on 12 April 2026.

13. The incident was self-reported. The breach did not have a significant impact on the National Electricity Market of Singapore. Furthermore, the MSCP recognises that Taser Power could not have reasonably anticipated the issue, given that the OEM failed to advise Taser Power on the possibility of the change in the unit configuration setting.

14. In view of the above, only a letter of non-compliance is issued in respect of the breach. Fixed costs of $2,500 are payable on account of the resources involved in investigating the incident.

Professor Walter Woon
Chairman, Market Surveillance and Compliance Panel